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Abstract: Internationally considerable policy attention is being paid to increasing the 
employment participation of disabled working age people. Like other OECD countries, 
Australia has experienced growth in the number of Disability Support Pension (DSP) 
recipients due to changes in industry structure and increases in precarious employment. 
This history is well-rehearsed in policy debates. However, little research attention has 
been given to the housing circumstances of DSP recipients. This is important, particularly 
when we note the increasing incidence of working age DSP recipients in the private 
rental market and public housing. For public renters the incidence has more than tripled 
to 27% over the period 1982-2002. This paper addresses two questions ‘What are the 
housing circumstances of DSP recipients?’ and ‘What are the likely consequences of 
program changes aimed at increasing employment participation of DSP recipients?’ 
Using Australia as an example this article considers interactions between the new 
disability payment system being implemented through Welfare to Work, housing costs 
and employment income. 
Welfare to Work in Australia: disability income support, housing affordability and employment incentives 
 3
1. Introduction 
In Australia the primary social security payment for disabled working age persons is 
Disability Support Pension (DSP)1. DSP receipt is traditionally associated with low 
labour force participation levels. It is a non-activity-tested payment, so a disabled person 
is not obligated to engage in job-seeking activities to receive DSP. In 2002 approximately 
88% of DSP recipients were economically inactive2 and only one-tenth of DSP recipients 
were employed. In contrast, in the same year only one-fifth of working age persons not 
receiving DSP were economically inactive. Those not in receipt of DSP were seven times 
as likely to be employed as DSP recipients3.  
 
In recent years disability policy in OECD countries has moved away from guaranteeing 
income security and emphasizing the importance of economic participation. Australia, 
along with countries like United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, have 
reduced disability cash benefit levels while increasing efforts to assist disabled people to 
gain employment (Mont 2004). In Australia the focus on DSP recipients is also being 
considered more broadly in the context of growth in the number of ‘economically 
inactive’ adults, particularly men (Lattimore 2007). This is the context for the May 2005 
Australian Government announced in the Budget 2005-2006 new Welfare to Work 
arrangements that ‘people with disabilities applying for welfare who can work part-time 
will be required to seek part-time work’ (Australian Government 2005). In November 
2005 this requirement was enacted in the Employment and Workplace Relations 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2005 (Parliament of 
Australia 2005). New disabled applicants assessed as being able to work at least 15 hours 
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per week would no longer be eligible for the non-activity-tested DSP. Instead like other 
unwaged working age persons, they would be eligible for a less generous activity-tested 
unemployment benefit called Newstart Allowance (NSA), payable only to persons 
seeking work.  
 
Following the budget announcement there has been considerable public debate about the 
likely outcomes of this proposed change. The Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS), the main peak organisation for non-government welfare service providers, 
argues that the chief effect will be to divert approximately 80% of new DSP applicants 
from the higher DSP payment to the lower NSA payment. It estimates that these 
applicants, if they remain on NSA, because they cannot find employment, will receive 
$40 per week less4 (Australian Council of Social Service 2005). The Australian 
Government on the other hand argues that a combination of the new 15-hour work test 
and Job Network services will result in a significant proportion of DSP applicants finding 
employment (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment Workplace 
Relations and Workforce Participation 2005).  
 
The parameters of this debate for and against changes to the DSP work test are well 
developed. However, there is a significant lacuna in this debate. There has been no 
examination of the housing circumstances of current DSP recipients, nor any attempt to 
forecast the housing circumstances of future applicants. A reading of recent reports 
confirms this lacuna. The report Job Network Disability Support Pension Pilot 
(Evaluation and Programme Performance Branch Employment Analysis and Evaluation 
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Group 2004) indicates no consideration was given to the housing circumstances of DSP 
recipients participating in a pilot program run through twelve Job Network providers 
aimed at increasing labour market participation. The annual report Characteristics of 
Disability Support Pension Customers (Office of Disability 2004) goes only so far as to 
note the housing tenure composition of DSP recipients in terms of ‘home owners’ and 
‘non-home owners’. Also the national parliament has not considered the housing 
circumstances of future DSP applicants. Both the reports of the Standing Committee on 
Employment Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation (2005) and Community 
Affairs Legislation Committee (2005) make only passing reference to housing costs. In 
sum, there is no considered discussion of housing in the lives of DSP recipients and 
future applicants.  
 
There is a prima facie case that the housing circumstances of DSP recipients do matter 
because of the connection between disability, poverty and housing stress. Saunders 
(2005) finds that ‘having a household member with a disability is associated with a 
substantial increase in the incidence of financial hardship, a higher probability of 
experiencing severe financial stress’. In 2002, the average disposable income of DSP 
recipients was only half the average disposable income of working age persons not 
receiving DSP. In the 2002 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, 12% of DSP recipients stated that they could not pay their mortgage or 
rent on time, compared to 8% of working age persons not receiving DSP.  
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The extent to which DSP recipients can be lifted out of financial and housing stress is 
potentially linked to their propensity to increase income through employment. Hence, 
affordable housing is most needed in locations with employment opportunities and 
essential services. However, in Australia the amount of well-located, affordable housing 
available to low-income persons, such as the disabled, is declining dramatically (Yates 
2005)5. Moreover, the degree to which work disincentives are built into the structure of 
the DSP program will influence the likelihood of seeking employment. DSP recipients 
may face an unemployment trap, whereby the simultaneous increase in tax liabilities and 
withdrawal of government benefits and housing assistance create a high work 
disincentive that trap low-income persons in cycles of poverty and non-employment. 
Mont (2004) notes that persons who go on disability programs rarely exit into 
employment with the outflow rate of only about 1% in Australia and other OECD 
countries such as the United States and Canada. 
 
This is the context for two questions addressed in this paper: ‘What are the housing 
circumstances of DSP recipients?’ and ‘What are the likely consequences of announced 
program changes aimed at increasing employment participation of DSP applicants 
diverted onto NSA?’ The paper responds to these questions in six parts. First, the paper 
describes the growth in DSP recipients and reviews the research analysing this growth. It 
is important that the broader trends and underlying causes are recognised before 
considering the DSP-housing relationship. Second, the paper presents an analysis of the 
housing circumstances of DSP recipients by describing the distribution of DSP recipients 
in the homeownership, private rental and public rental tenures. This highlights the 
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increasing incidence of DSP receipt in the private rental and public rental tenures. Third, 
the institutional context is described by outlining the tax-benefit and housing assistance 
programs in Australia. This is followed by an account of the DSP and NSA regimes and 
the methodology that has been used to simulate outcomes for the NSA regime that can be 
compared with the DSP regime. Fourth, the impact on housing affordability under the 
NSA regime is presented. Fifth, the impact on work disincentives for each of the tenure 
groups is presented. Finally, the paper illustrates the impact of the changes on real-life 
cases by presenting simulation results for two case studies.  
2. Growth in DSP 
The number of DSP recipients has been growing steadily for more than three decades as 
indicated in Figure 1. During this period there have been three distinct stages, 1972-1980, 
1983-1991 and 1992-2004 and in each the rate of increase in DSP recipients has grown. 
Only in the period 1980-1983 did the number of DSP recipients decline. Overall, the 
increase in DSP recipients in the period 1972-2004 has been approximately 400%.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Behind this increase in numbers there has also been an increase in expenditure through 
the DSP program. In 1995 constant Australian dollars there has been a 160% increase in 
the period 1980-2000 and GDP terms has increased from 0.6 to 1% of GDP (OECD 
2003). OECD data show that similar to Australia there has been growth in disability 
support payments in other OECD countries (OECD 2003:17). In the period 1990-1999 
the average for twenty OECD countries increased by 0.08 percentage points, from 1.22 to 
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1.30% of GDP. In this period only six countries experienced a decline in the percent of 
GDP expended on disability benefits while the other fourteen, including Australia, 
experienced an increase. This comparative data shows that it had the fifth highest 
increase, from 0.51 to 0.86% of GDP in the 1990-1999 period.  
 
The increase in DSP recipients has been well researched and summary conclusions can 
be drawn from this research about the characteristics and causes of growth. There is 
considerable evidence that structural change in Australian industry has been a major 
cause of the increase. Argyrous & Neale (2001) confirm the earlier Cass et al (1988) 
analysis by arguing that the rate of increase began in the 1970s as older males faced a 
weakening labour market due to a loss in ‘traditional’ male full-time jobs, especially in 
manufacturing. They argue that causality stems primarily from labour market change and 
introduce the term ‘labour market disabled’. Cai & Gregory (2004) similarly find that 
‘worsening labour market conditions, represented by an increase in the unemployment 
rate, led to an increase in the number of DSP recipients’. At the same time disability 
policy and practices are framed within the income security system and used to define the 
criteria for assessing applicants and how these criteria should be applied (Galvin 2003; 
2004; Cai & Gregory 2002; 2004). For example, Cai & Gregory (2002; 2004) point in 
particular to the 1991 policy change when eligibility criteria were relaxed and resulted in 
an increase in recipients.  
 
DSP recipients have an age, gender and type of disability profile. First, older people are 
more likely to become DSP recipients. For new recipients in the period 1995-2000 70% 
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of women and 70% of men were aged 40 or more. Further, among those aged 40 or more 
the men were more likely to be older (Chalmers & Siminski 2003 40). Another analysis 
of the age-disability connection argues that ‘disability onset is more likely the older a 
person gets, and the employment consequences of disability appear to be worse the older 
the age of onset’ (Wilkins 2004). Second, the proportion of women entrants has increased 
(1995-2000 33%-43%) and the proportion of men (1995-2000 67%-57%) has decreased. 
However, this has more to do with changes to the income security system than change in 
the labour market or rate of disability amongst women (Chalmers & Siminski 2003). 
Third, the three largest groups of DSP recipients are those with a 
musculoskeletal/connective tissue condition (34%), a psychological/ psychiatric illness 
(25.4%) and an intellectual/learning medical condition (10.7%) (Office of Disability 
2004). Considered against the background of age the musculoskeletal connective tissue 
condition increases significantly with age. On the other hand the psychological/ 
psychiatric illness and intellectual/learning medical condition decreases with age 
(Chalmers & Siminski 2003).  
 
Evidence of the time spent on DSP can only be calculated in terms of ‘duration of 
completed spells’ on DSP. The analysis shows that the average duration of completed 
spells on DSP was 9-10 years. This duration varied a little depending on whether 
recipients were transferring from another form of income support, in which case their 
average completed duration spell was longer, or those who came from outside the income 
support system, in which case they had a shorter average completed duration (Cai 2002). 
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There is also a spatial variation in the distribution of DSP recipients that reinforces the 
argument that DSP incidence is associated with labour market change. Older industrial 
provincial centres, such as Wollongong and Newcastle and capital cities with lower rates 
of economic growth such as Adelaide and Hobart, exhibit higher DSP recipient rates 
(Healy 2002). Within metropolitan Melbourne Berry et al (2005) suggest a similar 
association between areas that have experienced industrial restructuring and higher DSP 
recipient rates. DSP recipients are also a group in internal migration patterns and indicate 
a flow from major cities and the dry inland areas to smaller communities, especially to 
temperate costal areas (Morrow 2000). This often involves change in housing tenure, 
including leaving public housing, changing from owner to renter and paying increased 
rent (ibid).  
3. DSP recipients and their housing 
The housing circumstances of DSP recipients can be understood initially by examining 
their tenure. Using the Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC), the 
percentage of DSP recipients among working age persons, in each housing tenure, for the 
period 1982-2002, is presented in Figure 2. Outright owners are homeowners with no 
mortgage. Owner purchasers are homeowners financing their home purchase with a 
mortgage. Private renters rent from landlords apart from a state housing authority (SHA). 
Public renters rent from a SHA. Those living rent-free neither own nor rent and are 
excluded from the analysis. Several noteworthy trends can be observed from Figure 2 
about how the growing number of DSP recipients has intersected with housing tenure 
arrangements in the last two decades.  
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Figure 2 here 
 
As shown in Figure 2, between 1982 and 2002 the percentage of DSP recipients slightly 
more than doubled among outright owners, owner purchasers and private renters. This 
increase was from 3% to 7% among outright owners, 0.7% to 1.8% among owner 
purchasers and 2% to 4.5% among private renters. Notably, the DSP rate more than 
tripled among public renters from 8% to 27%. 
 
Among outright owners this increase is overwhelmingly amongst older persons. In 2002, 
21% of DSP recipients in outright ownership were in the 45-54 band and 69% in the 55-
64 age band. Like outright owners, purchasers and public renters receiving DSP were 
concentrated into the 45-54 and 55-64 bands (38% in each band) though they tended to 
be younger than outright owners. The age profile of private renters receiving DSP 
differed with a more even distribution of persons at approximately 25% across the 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 age bands.   
 
In 2002, outright owners made up 36% of DSP recipients, followed by private renters 
(30%), public renters (19%) and purchasers (15%). This provides evidence of what 
Castles (1997:108) argues is the ‘home ownership effect’ on retirement decisions, where 
‘the possession of a home free of mortgage lowers the income threshold at which an 
individual can contemplate exit from the labour market’. However, the tenure most over-
represented among the DSP population is public housing. Whereas public renters were 
only 3% of the working age population in 2002, the percentage of public renters among 
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the DSP population was six times as high at 19%. The sharp rate of increase in DSP 
receipt among public renters and their over-representation among the DSP population 
make this is a group that is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of Welfare to Work. 
4. Changing from DSP to the NSA regime 
All OECD countries have disability programs that provide cash benefits to disabled 
persons. Universal programs pay benefits to all disabled people (Sweden, Denmark), 
contributory programs pay benefits to disabled workers who make tax-based 
contributions (Austria, Canada), and non-contributory means-tested programs are 
targeted to groups in most need (Australia). Some countries have more than one type of 
program. For example, the United Kingdom has contributory and non-contributory 
programs (Mont 2004). Both the DSP and NSA programs in Australia are non-
contributory means-tested programs. 
 
Under the Welfare to Work rules disabled welfare applicants from 1 July 2006 will only 
receive DSP if they are assessed as being incapable of 15 hours work a week. If assessed 
as being capable of at least 15 hours work, they will receive NSA and be obligated to 
seek part-time work. The preliminary estimate of the number of people diverted from 
DSP to NSA over three years are: 34,400 in 2006-07; 57,900 in 2007-08; and 75,700 in 
2008-09 (Employment and Workplace Relations and Education Legislation Committee 
2005). 
 
The differences between the DSP and NSA regimes are illustrated in Figure 3. Firstly, 
DSP is a pension, while NSA is an allowance. Pensions are benefits paid to people 
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expected to be indefinitely out of the labour force, such as the aged and disabled. 
Allowances are benefits paid to unwaged people seeking work or who are expected to 
return to work in the short-term (including persons with short-term sicknesses). Pensions 
are more generous than allowances. The current weekly maximum DSP rate for single 
(partnered) persons is approximately $40 ($20) higher than NSA (S1>S2 in Figure 3). 
Second, the DSP income-free area (allowable income level before the benefit is reduced) 
is higher and increases by $24.60 per fortnight per dependent child (Y1
f> Y2
f). Hence, 
DSP recipients can earn up to a higher income level before their benefit is reduced. 
Third, DSP recipients experience a lower benefit withdrawal rate as private income 
increases. The DSP withdrawal rate is currently 40 cents (20 cents) in the dollar for 
single (partnered) persons. This means that for singles, DSP is withdrawn at 40 cents for 
each additional dollar earned past the income-free area. Once a NSA recipient’s income 
exceeds the income-free area of $62 per fortnight, NSA is reduced by 50 cents in the 
dollar. A second income test threshold applies at $250 per fortnight. Income, which 
exceeds this second threshold, reduces NSA at a rate of 60 cents in the dollar. A 
partnered recipient’s NSA is further reduced by 60 cents in the dollar once the partner’s 
income exceeds the benefit cut-out point. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Because the DSP and NSA regimes interact with the tax and housing assistance systems, 
the impacts of a shift from DSP to NSA cannot be obtained from an analysis of the 
benefits alone. First, DSP is non-taxable while NSA is taxable. Hence, DSP recipients 
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diverted onto NSA will face a decrease in disposable income if they do not gain 
employment. Second, public renters pay income-related rents, set at the lower of 25% of 
income or market rent. They receive housing assistance in the form of a housing subsidy 
equivalent to market rent minus income-related rent. When diverted onto NSA, public 
renters’ income and therefore rent will fall, resulting in an increase in subsidy. Because 
of these interactions, a microsimulaton methodology is employed to assess the 
implications of diverting DSP applicants onto NSA. A microsimulaton model is a 
quantitative model that simulates tax-benefit parameters for a sample of individuals, 
frequently employed to predict the impacts of policies changes by setting alternative 
scenarios, varying the tax-benefit parameters and simulating the impacts of the change. It 
is a technique particularly suitable for finding accurate estimates in systems where the 
interactions within the system are complex. Examples include the United Kingdom 
Institute of Fiscal Studies’ tax and benefit model (Giles & McCrae 1995) and Canada’s 
Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (Statistics Canada 2006). In this paper 
estimates of the impacts of the change from DSP to NSA are derived using the Australian 
Housing and Urban Research Institute’s (AHURI) tax-benefit model (Wood et al. 2006b).  
 
The AHURI tax-benefit model is operationalised using SIHC microdata, which contains 
cases that reflect the heterogeneity of the Australian population and is a rich source of 
income and housing data. While the Welfare to Work reforms were fully implemented in 
July 2006, the latest SIHC available at the time of writing of this paper was the 2002 
SIHC. The methodology is based on the assumption that future (post-July 2006) DSP 
recipients have a profile similar to current (2002) DSP recipients. Using the model, we 
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generate housing affordability and work incentive measures for current DSP recipients in 
the 2002 SIHC under the 2002 DSP regime. Next we simulate a policy change by 
assuming that all current DSP recipients are moved onto NSA. The model is used to 
compute the housing affordability and work incentive measures for all current DSP 
recipients as if the new NSA parameters described above in Figure 3 apply.  
 
It must be stressed that this simulation does not demonstrate the actual impact of the 
reforms for new DSP applicants after July 2006. However, it does enable identification of 
groups whose housing affordability and work incentives are expected to be affected if we 
assume that the future profile of DSP recipients matches that of current DSP recipients, 
and if all future applicants are diverted into the NSA regime. As the number of SIHC 
cases available for analysis is rather small, we validate the SIHC estimates by producing 
a second set of estimates using the HILDA Survey for a comparable year6. The text 
commentary refers only to the 2002 SIHC. However, estimates from both surveys are 
reported in the tables, and similar observations can be drawn from both sets of estimates. 
 
Both housing affordability and work incentive measures are based on income units. An 
income unit is different from the household because an income unit comprises one or 
more persons whose command over income is shared between the people comprising the 
unit (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997). Income sharing is assumed to take place 
amongst couples, and between parents and dependents. A household comprises people 
who typically reside together, and can contain more than one income unit. In Australia 
the income unit is the standard unit for analyses of economic well-being. It is often the 
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preferred approach in Australian housing studies (Landt & Bray 1997; Wood et al. 
2006a). DSP income units are income units in which at least one income unit member 
receives DSP.   
5. Impacts on housing affordability 
In Australia income units are in housing stress if they are in the bottom 40% of the gross 
income distribution and pay more than 30% of gross income on housing (National 
Housing Strategy 1991). In 2002, 81% of DSP income units were in the bottom 40% of 
the income distribution compared to 37% of non-DSP income units7. Hence, there are 
clear housing affordability implications for DSP applicants diverted onto NSA who do 
not find work. While the DSP and NSA regimes do not differ across tenure, their 
interactions with the housing assistance systems mean that the impacts of diverting DSP 
recipients onto NSA can be significantly different across tenure groups. 
 
We employ three measures to quantify the differential impacts of the policy simulation 
across housing tenures. First, we compare before- and after-housing income. Second, we 
calculate a housing affordability ratio, which expresses housing costs as a percentage of 
income unit income. Third, we measure the percentage of income units in housing stress 
under the alternative regimes. Housing costs for outright owners are general and water 
rates; for purchasers rates and mortgage repayments; for private renters rent less CRA; 
and for public renters income-related rents. Any housing assistance received is treated as 
an offset against housing costs, not as part of income. Hence, our affordability ratio is a 
net affordability ratio (NAR). In this section, income is equivalised using OECD 
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equivalence scales that allocate 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for each additional adult and 0.5 
for each child. The simulation results are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 shows that for owners, housing costs do not change following the policy change. 
For private renters, housing costs increase slightly. This is because a small percentage of 
private renters who receive DSP would not be eligible for NSA in the new regime 
because the NSA cut-out point is lower than the DSP cut-out point. Hence, they will not 
receive CRA because CRA is paid as a supplement to government benefits. Public renters 
experience a substantial fall in housing costs because rents are income-related.  
 
Private renters experience the greatest increase in average NAR of 4.5 percentage points 
following the policy change. The housing stress figures support the NAR findings, with 
private renters experiencing the greatest rise in proportion in housing stress following the 
policy change. In recent decades there has been a pronounced decline in housing 
affordability for low-income private renters (Yates 2005; Yates et al. 2004; Wood et al. 
2005a). Private renters diverted onto NSA will receive less income and experience a 
reduced housing affordability. Private renters pay market rent and receive housing 
assistance in the form of a cash benefit called Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA). 
Both DSP and NSA recipients are eligible for CRA but the level of CRA received is 
dependent on the market rent level rather than income level. Hence, while private renters 
will experience a decrease in income, they will not benefit from an increase in CRA as 
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long as rent remains the same. The change from DSP to NSA therefore has potentially 
significant negative implications for private renters’ housing affordability levels.  
 
Owner purchasers have the highest housing costs because of mortgage repayments. 
However, as opposed to private renters, purchasers experience little change in the level of 
housing stress following the policy change despite high housing costs. Purchasers’ 
average after-housing income is almost twice the average of all tenures. This is not 
surprising as over one-third of DSP purchaser income units are employed, compared to 
under 15% of the other tenures. In the 2002 HILDA Survey, one-quarter of DSP private 
renter income units reported inability to pay rent on time, while only 16% of DSP 
purchaser income units reported that they could not pay their mortgage on time. 
Moreover, the extent of purchasers’ decline to housing affordability will depend a great 
deal on the length of time they have been purchasers. Purchasers in the early period of 
mortgage, especially first home purchasers, typically pay a large proportion of income in 
repayments. In later years repayments are likely to form a smaller proportion of income. 
If the age profile of purchasers who apply for DSP is the same as the current profile of 
DSP recipients it is likely that most will be in the later years of the mortgage and 
therefore experience a moderate decline in housing affordability.  
 
Outright owners experience almost no change in housing affordability. Outright owners 
do not make mortgage repayments and therefore have low housing costs. Low-income 
outright owners traditionally experience few housing affordability problems.  
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Public renters typically pay income-related rent set at 25% of income and almost all have 
such low incomes that mean they do not pay the median market rent. Consequently when 
public renters are diverted onto NSA their rent will fall and the level of subsidy will 
increase. This is happening in a housing sector that is very constrained as Australian 
government funding for public housing has declined by one-quarter in real terms over the 
period 1990-2000 (Hall & Berry 2004). This has been a result of the government’s 
decision to increasingly use CRA to provide housing assistance to low income 
Australians.  The result has been increased rationing of public housing stock and an 
increasing proportion of public housing eligible persons being forced to rent privately. 
Moreover, it is important to note that this change will reduce SHA revenue. Already the 
combined effect of reducing grant income and declining tenant incomes has resulted in 
SHAs incurring structural deficits (Hall & Berry 2004). The introduction of this new 
regime will further undermine SHA financial viability. SHAs will experience rent 
revenue loss as existing DSP recipients move out of public housing and are replaced by 
tenants who apply for DSP but are judged to be able to work at least 15 hours per week8. 
If we assume that all DSP recipients in public housing in 2002 were moved onto NSA, 
SHA rent income would be reduced by $33 million. 
 
6. Impacts on work disincentives 
In order to quantify the work incentives facing DSP recipients who are unemployed or 
economically inactive (unwaged), we measure and compare the replacement ratio (RR) 
under the DSP and NSA regimes using the microsimulation model and Wood et al. 
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(2005b) RR methodology9. The RR is the ratio of income when unwaged to income when 
employed. The higher is the RR the lower are the financial returns to work. 
 




ii YYR /     
where  iR  = RR of person i 
n
iY  = income unit disposable income when person i is not working 
w
iY  = income unit disposable income when person i is working.  
RRs are computed for each unwaged individual holding the employment status of the 
partner (if there is one) constant. Hence, in the case of a couple income unit where one 
partner is employed but the other is not, we calculate the RR for the unwaged partner 
only, holding the waged partner’s employed status constant. Where both partners are 
unwaged, we calculate a RR for the first unwaged partner holding the second’s unwaged 
status constant and then separately calculate a RR for the second partner holding the first’ 
unwaged status constant. This is done because the expected wage of each individual is 
likely to be different resulting in different RRs for partners within an income unit. As in 
the case of housing affordability, the income measures in the numerator and denominator 
of the RR are income unit income. Because partners within an income unit share income, 
the work incentive of a partnered person will be affected by his/her income unit’s income 
rather than his/her income alone. For example, in the first case where one partner is 
employed but the other is not, the employed partner’s wage will cushion the unwaged 
partner’s economic well-being, hence blunting the unwaged partner’s work incentives.  
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Importantly, the microsimulation model allows Australian tax provisions and income 
support parameters to be taken into account in both niY  and 
w
iY . Even when an unwaged 
person gains employment, he/she is still eligible to receive benefits at a reduced rate if 
income is low. Wage estimates are derived from wage equations that have been estimated 
from samples of working age male and female employees. The equations control for 
selection bias using the Heckman correction and are reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 presents RR estimates by housing tenure in terms of mean and median RRs 
together with the percentage of persons with RRs greater than 75%.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Table 3 shows that overall RRs are 6-9 percentage points higher under the NSA regime 
than the DSP regime. In other words the financial disincentive, regardless of tenure, will 
be greater under the NSA regime. This is mainly due to NSA being less generous than 
DSP. As Figure 3 shows, NSA provides a lower level of benefit income than DSP. As 
most unwaged DSP recipients would attract low wages if employed, most would still be 
entitled to part payments of benefits in an employed state10. NSA has a lower income-free 
threshold and higher withdrawal rates than DSP. Hence, when an unwaged DSP recipient 
moves into employment, he/she loses a higher level of government benefit payment 
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under the NSA regime than the DSP regime. The mean benefit level received by 
unwaged DSP recipients under the DSP regime is $10,619 and approximately 11% lower 
at $9,447 under the NSA regime. The mean benefit level received by DSP recipients, if 
they gain employment, is $6,191 under the DSP regime, but three times as low at $2,168 
under the NSA regime.  
 
DSP recipients in public housing have higher RRs than DSP recipients in other tenures. 
Hence, public renters experience the lowest returns to employment of all DSP recipients. 
This is mainly attributed to the withdrawal of housing subsidy that accompanies any gain 
in employment (Dalton & Ong 2005). The simulation indicates that the proportion of 
public renters experiencing a RR greater than 75% will increase from 21% to 65%, 
indicating a tripling in the proportion of public renters whose income while not employed 
is over three-quarters of the income they can expect to receive on gaining employment11. 
While unwaged owner purchasers have relatively high RRs, this is largely because of 
their partners’ income, which cushion their decline in economic well-being while they 
remain unwaged. Over three-quarters of unwaged purchasers are partnered and among 
these, 34% have employed partners. In contrast, under one-quarter of public renters in 
our sample have partners and among these only 6% have employed partners. Further, the 
data show, but not presented in this article, that females typically have a higher RR than 
males under both the DSP and NSA because they attract a lower wage than males if they 
were to gain employment.  
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Lastly, the RR estimates suggest that this new policy will run counter to another 
government policy objective, which aims to increase public renters’ employment 
participation. The CSHA requires SHAs ‘to ensure that housing assistance supports 
access to employment and promotes social and labour market participation’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2003). This SHA responsibility is likely to become more 
onerous.  
7. Individuals, housing affordability and work disincentives  
Finally, we illustrate the effect of Welfare to Work for two real-life cases to illustrate 
what the policy change means to individuals from interview data obtained from two 
current DSP recipients, a private renter and a public renter. As indicated by our empirical 
analysis, private renters face substantial housing affordability problems while public 
renters suffer from high work disincentives, which are likely to be exacerbated by the 
policy change. We assumed that they were applying for DSP post-July 2006 and were 
judged capable of working at least 15 hours per week. The model was used to calculate 
their housing affordability levels and RRs under the two regimes:  
 
 Case 1 is a single male private renter, economically inactive since the late 1990s, 
pays $140 rent per week and receives CRA;  
 Case 2 is a partnered male public renter, economically inactive since 2002. His 
partner is working part-time and receiving NSA at a reduced rate. 
 
Case 1, under the DSP regime, has a NAR of 44%. Being in the lowest 40% of the 
income distribution he is in housing stress. As expected, housing affordability for Case 1 
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declines when moved to the NSA regime, indicated by a NAR increase to 51%. Under 
the NSA regime, half of Case 1’s income would be spent on housing costs, leaving little 
income for other necessities, including additional medical costs that disabled often have 
to meet. For Case 2 the NAR stays the same at 14% because rent is set at 25% of income. 
However, Case 2 has higher work disincentives than Case 1 because of a rapid 
withdrawal of rent subsidy as income increases. The RRs indicates that Case 1’s RR 
increases from 60% to 67% when moved from DSP to NSA. Case 2’s RR increases from 
71% to 80%. Under NSA, Case 2’s income when unwaged is fourth-fifth of expected 
income when employed. After taking into account work-related expenditures such as 
transport costs that are not reflected in the RR, Case 2 will find returns to work to be 
extremely low.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has presented an analysis of the connection between housing and the DSP. Its 
starting point was the observation that the Welfare to Work policy regime which will 
result in DSP applicants being redirected onto NSA, with accompanying economic 
requirements, does not take account of the housing circumstances of these future DSP 
applicants. In this context two questions were posed.  
 
The first question asked: ‘What are the housing circumstances of working age DSP 
recipients?’ The evidence shows a distinctive pattern in the distribution of DSP recipients 
across housing tenures. DSP recipients who are outright owners and private renters stand 
out as the two largest groups in 2002 by comprising 36% and 30% of all DSP recipients 
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respectively (see section 3). However, the tenure most over-represented among the DSP 
population is public housing. Whereas public renters were only 3% of the working age 
population in 2002, the percentage of public renters among the DSP population was six 
times as high at 19%. The high rate of DSP receipt among public renters in 2002 (27% in 
figure 2) and their over-representation among the DSP population make this a group 
particularly vulnerable to Welfare to Work.  
 
In the light of this pattern a second question asked: ‘What are the likely consequences of 
announced program changes aimed at increasing labour market participation of DSP 
applicants diverted onto NSA?’ The following can be drawn from the analysis. The 
proposed changes will have the greatest impact on renters, both private and public. First, 
private renters applying for DSP and diverted onto NSA will have less income and 
experience a decline in housing affordability. CRA is ineffective in mitigating the 
affordability decline, as the level of CRA payment is dependent on the market rent paid 
and not on income level. Second, while public renters currently have the impact of the 
change moderated because of income-related rents, increased rationing of public housing 
stock will force many future public housing eligible persons to rely on the private rental 
market for housing, putting them at risk of substantial affordability problems. Third, an 
unintended consequence of the policy change will be a reduction in SHA revenue that 
will exacerbate existing structural deficits. Fourth, the NSA regime will lower the 
financial return to work for future DSP applicants in all tenures, evident in the increase in 
RR for income units in each tenure. Public renters who are DSP recipients currently 
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experience the lowest financial return to work and this will be exacerbated under the new 
system.  
 
Currently there appears to be a trade-off between housing affordability and financial 
returns to work for renters. While public renters usually do not have housing affordability 
problems they face high work disincentives. While private renters’ RRs are low relative 
to public renters, they suffer from severe housing affordability problems. Welfare to 
Work will intensify affordability problems and reduce financial returns to work. Private 
and public renters are especially vulnerable groups in the context of Welfare to Work. 
The Australian experience can be used to sound a cautionary note to policy makers in 
other OECD countries seeking to constrain disability payments and increase labour 
market participation.  It is important to consider the way in which housing interacts with 
income support systems, tax and labour market income if national goals are to extend 
beyond economic goals and include fairness.      
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1 Non-dependent persons aged 15-64.  
2 Neither working nor seeking work. 
3 Authors’ calculations from the 2002 Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC). All 2002 estimates in the text are 
from authors’ calculations from the 2002 SIHC unless stated otherwise. 
4 The maximum DSP rate is currently approximately $40 per week higher than the maximum Newstart rate for a single 
person without children.  
5 Contractions in the stock of low-income rental housing have been documented in other countries. Examples include 
Park (2000) from the United States, and Miron (1995) from Canada. 
6 Estimates from the 2002 SIHC are based on current 2002 weekly income. Estimates from the HILDA Survey are 
based on 2002-03 financial year income. 
7 Income units with negative or zero gross income unit income are removed. 
8 In 2005 the number of new households entering public housing as a percentage of total number of public renters was 
9.5% (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005:43). Data from earlier years indicate a similar rate of change. 
9 93% of DSP recipients in 2002 were unwaged.  
10 The mean wage that an unwaged DSP recipient would attract upon gaining employment is only $18,900 compared to 
$22,900 for an unwaged person not receiving DSP in 2002. 
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11 As shown by the median RRs in Table 3, the average public renter already has a RR of 70% under the DSP regime. 
When moved onto NSA, the average public renter’s RR rises over the 75% benchmark, to 78%. 
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Table 2: Housing affordability of DSP income unitsa, under DSP and NSA systems, 2002-03 


















Mean housing cost (dollars per year)  
DSP 989 6,387 3,522 2,890 2,846 0 6,581 4,165 3,281 2,979 
NSA  989 6,387 3,548 2,635 2,800 0 6,581 4,241 3,037 2,943 
Percentage change 0.0 0.0 0.7 -8.8 -1.6  0.0 1.8 -7.4 -1.2 
Mean before-housing cost income (dollars per year)  
DSP 28,785 48,492 20,154 19,082 26,479 37,592 45,404 30,911 24,213 33,589 
NSA 27,057 46,040 18,519 17,777 24,780 34,588 42,927 28,681 22,904 31,296 
Percentage change -6.0 -5.1 -8.1 -6.8 -6.4 -8.0 -5.5 -7.2 -5.4 -6.8 
Mean after-housing cost income (dollars per year)  
DSP 27,796 42,105 16,633 16,192 23,633 37,592 38,823 26,746 20,931 30,610 
NSA 26,068 39,653 14,971 15,143 21,980 34,588 36,346 24,440 19,867 28,353 
Percentage change -6.2 -5.8 -10.0 -6.5 -7.0 -8.0 -6.4 -8.6 -5.1 -7.4 
Average NAR (percent)  
DSP  4.7 20.8 23.8 21.0 16.1 0.0 24.9 21.8 19.2 14.7 
NSA  5.3 22.5 28.3 21.2 17.9 0.0 28.1 25.6 19.2 16.2 
Percentage point difference 0.5 1.7 4.5 0.2 1.8 0.0 3.2 3.7 0.0 1.6 
Percentage in housing stress (percent)  
DSP  0.0 16.5 23.9 1.4 9.8 0.0 27.7 23.0 1.0 11.1 
NSA  0.5 17.7 27.9 3.1 11.7 0.0 30.8 28.7 1.0 13.2 
Percentage point difference 0.5 1.2 4.0 1.7 1.9 0.0 3.1 5.7 0.0 2.1 
Number of cases  
Samplec  191 65 166 128 550 84 48 99 74 305 
Population (‘000s)d 144 50 127 86 408 115 53 105 86 358 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2002 SIHC and HILDA Survey wave 3 
Notes:  
a. The sample comprises DSP income units. 
b. The HILDA Survey does not contain data on general and water rates. Hence, housing costs for owners exclude rates.  
c. Estimates for owner purchasers need to be interpreted with caution given the small sample size of this group. 
d. Estimates are weighted by population weights or expansion factors to produce estimates for the whole population. This procedure ensures that the survey estimates conform to benchmarks that are 
based on the numbers of persons and households in the Australian population. 
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Table 3: Wage regression estimates, male and female employees, 2002 
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. 
SIHC (dependent variable is log of current weekly annualised wage) 
 Males Females 
Constant 5.802 0.049 0.000 5.790 0.063 0.000 
Age (15-19 omitted)       
 20-24 0.303 0.048 0.000 0.229 0.059 0.000 
 25-34 0.524 0.052 0.000 0.480 0.056 0.000 
 35-44 0.595 0.061 0.000 0.514 0.058 0.000 
 45-54 0.594 0.071 0.000 0.379 0.060 0.000 
 55-64 0.405 0.106 0.000 -0.041 0.095 0.664 
Married/de facto 0.185 0.025 0.000 -0.031 0.022 0.159 
Number of dependent children aged 0-2 -0.003 0.024 0.908 -0.340 0.052 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 3-4 0.061 0.031 0.044 -0.302 0.048 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 5-9 0.021 0.019 0.259 -0.221 0.029 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 10-14 -0.007 0.016 0.679 -0.138 0.020 0.000 
Country of birth (Australia omitted)       
 Main English-speaking countries 0.074 0.025 0.003 0.029 0.031 0.338 
 Other -0.223 0.027 0.000 -0.254 0.041 0.000 
Highest educational qualification (no post-school qualification omitted)       
 Still at school -1.917 0.431 0.000 -1.058 0.382 0.006 
 Bachelor degree or higher 0.493 0.036 0.000 0.678 0.040 0.000 
 Other post-school qualification 0.128 0.018 0.000 0.226 0.028 0.000 
Location (Territories omitted)       
 Sydney 0.044 0.039 0.255 -0.125 0.045 0.006 
 Rest of New South Wales -0.168 0.056 0.003 -0.549 0.064 0.000 
 Melbourne 0.003 0.035 0.933 -0.190 0.042 0.000 
 Rest of Victoria -0.239 0.055 0.000 -0.449 0.063 0.000 
 Brisbane -0.113 0.041 0.006 -0.299 0.048 0.000 
 Rest of Queensland -0.172 0.047 0.000 -0.407 0.055 0.000 
 Adelaide -0.118 0.044 0.007 -0.259 0.047 0.000 
 Rest of South Australia -0.136 0.065 0.038 -0.486 0.074 0.000 
 Perth -0.036 0.044 0.411 -0.339 0.046 0.000 
 Rest of Western Australia -0.086 0.056 0.124 -0.552 0.069 0.000 
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Explanatory variables Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. 
 Hobart -0.191 0.065 0.003 -0.322 0.074 0.000 
 Rest of Tasmania -0.176 0.056 0.002 -0.610 0.072 0.000 
Number of months unemployed in last seven months -0.252 0.055 0.000 -0.318 0.044 0.000 
Number of months economically inactive in last seven months -0.364 0.091 0.000 -0.548 0.074 0.000 
Lambda 0.414 0.195 0.034 0.866 0.168 0.000 
Sample 5,011 4,392 
Adjusted R-sq 0.265 0.225 
P>F 0.000 0.000 
 
HILDA Survey (dependent variable is log of financial year wage) 
 Males Females 
Constant 9.549 0.089 0.000 9.099 0.229 0.000 
Marital status (Single never married omitted)       
 Married/de facto  0.400 0.043 0.000 0.050 0.070 0.478 
 Divorced, separated or widowed 0.150 0.066 0.024 0.069 0.097 0.478 
Highest educational qualification (Year 11 and below omitted)       
 Year 12 0.095 0.051 0.063 0.312 0.097 0.001 
 Certificate not defined 0.021 0.320 0.949 0.049 0.231 0.832 
 Certificate I or II -0.398 0.153 0.009 -0.492 0.179 0.006 
 Certificate III or IV 0.197 0.042 0.000 0.374 0.103 0.000 
 Diploma or advanced diploma 0.200 0.054 0.000 0.452 0.098 0.000 
 Bachelor degree 0.393 0.051 0.000 0.750 0.138 0.000 
 Graduate diploma or graduate certificate 0.447 0.070 0.000 0.832 0.145 0.000 
 Postgraduate degree 0.520 0.073 0.000 0.984 0.166 0.000 
Months in paid work since left full-time education 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 
Square of months in paid work since left full-time education  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Months unemployed since left full-time education -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.002 0.000 
English proficiency (Australian-born omitted)       
 Good -0.152 0.052 0.003 -0.110 0.073 0.131 
 Poor -0.478 0.180 0.008 -0.558 0.315 0.077 
Location (Sydney omitted)       
 Rest of New South Wales -0.217 0.052 0.000 -0.188 0.066 0.005 
 Melbourne -0.101 0.046 0.029 -0.167 0.057 0.003 
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Explanatory variables Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. Coef. Std. 
error 
Sig. 
 Rest of Victoria -0.358 0.062 0.000 -0.326 0.079 0.000 
 Brisbane -0.235 0.054 0.000 -0.142 0.068 0.037 
 Rest of Queensland -0.277 0.053 0.000 -0.237 0.068 0.001 
 Adelaide -0.316 0.063 0.000 -0.304 0.079 0.000 
 Rest of South Australia -0.456 0.089 0.000 -0.513 0.117 0.000 
 Perth -0.060 0.060 0.316 -0.236 0.080 0.003 
 Rest of Western Australia -0.053 0.090 0.558 -0.363 0.124 0.003 
 Tasmania -0.419 0.098 0.000 -0.310 0.107 0.004 
 Northern Territory -0.241 0.151 0.110 0.266 0.189 0.158 
 Australian Capital Territory -0.028 0.096 0.771 -0.027 0.124 0.829 
Number of dependent children aged 0-2 -0.023 0.037 0.533 -0.462 0.120 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 3-4 0.037 0.048 0.434 -0.359 0.078 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 5-9 -0.036 0.028 0.199 -0.193 0.041 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 10-12 -0.026 0.035 0.462 -0.152 0.043 0.000 
Number of dependent children aged 13-14 0.041 0.049 0.404 -0.139 0.056 0.013 
Has disability or long-term health condition -0.430 0.097 0.000 -0.299 0.117 0.011 
Lambda 0.494 0.217 0.023 0.333 0.324 0.304 
Sample 3,373 3,226 
Adjusted R-sq 0.303 0.203 
P>F 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2002 SIHC and HILDA Survey wave 3 
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Table 4: RRs of unwaged DSP recipientsa, under existing DSP and NSA systems, 2002, percent 


















Mean RR  
DSP 63.5 65.5 60.3 68.5 63.9 62.5 62.7 65.6 69.4 64.8 
NSA  71.1 71.5 64.5 74.5 69.9 65.0 65.1 68.8 74.0 67.9 
Percentage point difference 7.6 6.1 4.2 6.0 6.1 2.5 2.4 3.3 4.6 3.1 
Median RR  
DSP 62.1 64.7 59.6 70.2 62.9 61.0 61.1 64.6 67.0 64.1 
NSA 72.0 74.8 67.3 78.1 71.6 67.5 66.3 72.0 76.9 70.0 
Percentage point difference 9.9 10.0 7.7 7.9 8.7 6.5 5.3 7.4 9.9 5.9 
Percent of cases with RR>75%  
DSP 8.9 25.1 7.9 20.5 13.2 14.9 17.7 22.5 30.6 20.7 
NSA 43.7 48.2 21.9 64.6 42.1 23.1 20.1 43.0 59.0 35.4 
Percentage point difference 34.7 23.1 14.0 44.1 28.9 8.2 2.5 20.5 28.4 14.7 
Number of cases      
Sample 207 80 163 131 581 104 57 95 74 330 
Population (‘000s)b 164 63 129 87 442 151 69 102 90 412 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2002 SIHC and HILDA Survey wave 3 
Notes: 
a. The sample excludes unwaged DSP recipients who own businesses or investment properties. 
b. Estimates are weighted by population weights or expansion factors to produce estimates for the whole population. This procedure ensures that the survey estimates conform to benchmarks that are 
based on the numbers of persons and households in the Australian population. 
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